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INTRODUCTION 
The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) was the basic internal security threat to 
the United Kingdom over the past 100 years. In particular, more than 3,600 people died 
during the “Troubles” (1969-1996). However, authorities no longer consider Irish 
paramilitary organizations the country’s major terrorist threat.1 The major terrorist 
challenge to the UK today comes from international terrorist groups affiliated with al 
Qaeda. Until recently, the nexus of the affiliation with al Qaeda was Pakistan and 
Afghanistan. Recent attacks suggest a nexus with Iraq as well. However, the emergence 
of a new threat such as al Qaeda does not mean that intelligence analysts’ thinking, 
conditioned to meet one threat, e.g. PIRA, adjusts readily to the new threat.2 The 
analysis here highlights this issue in the recent patterns of terrorism prevention in the 
UK. 
Three agencies make up the national intelligence and security services in the UK, The 
Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) – the nation’s external intelligence agency overseen by 
the foreign secretary; the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) – which 
develops signals intelligence, also overseen by the foreign secretary; and the Security 
Service (MI5), which operates under the authority of the home secretary to conduct 
surveillance operations. Observers often refer to the three services as the Agencies. MI5 
has no arrest powers of its own, meaning its effectiveness in preempting terrorist 
operations depends largely on collaboration with the Special Branch (SB) of local police 
forces’, especially the Metropolitan Police Department’s Special Branch (MPSB).3  
Following the September 11, 2001 attacks (9/11) in the United States, the government 
of the UK assumed the consensus opinion that the Agencies had failed to recognize the 
significance of al Qaeda.4 As a result, MI5 established the Joint Terrorism Analysis 
Centre (JTAC). JTAC was hailed as “the most significant structural development within 
the intelligence community,” pooling international terrorism intelligence in one central 
location “under the direction of one central authority, the director-general of MI5.”5 
Islamic extremists either attempted attacks, or successfully attacked, the UK in the 
summers of 2005 and 2007. In addition to actual attacks, the Agencies disrupted 
numerous plots within the UK by terrorist groups over the past few years. The 
discussion below analyzes patterns in the prevention activities of the intelligence, 
security, and police services of the UK by examining three terrorist attacks, but 
principally the most devastating one on July 7, 2005 (7 July) as well as the two most 
complex preempted plots.  
Following William Pelfrey’s seminal article on the cycle of preparedness framework,6 
the analysis here uses the Prevention Cube model7 (see Figure 1) to explore the 
relationship between terrorist attacks in the UK that occurred since 7 July, and key plots 
in which authorities successfully intervened to preempt attacks. To do so requires a 
common framework for analyzing “successful” and “unsuccessful” attack plots. Just as 
effective collaboration and information sharing provide a basis for recognizing threats, 
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and deciding whether to intervene to preempt them, so can ineffective collaboration and 
information sharing result in failure to develop opportunities for preemption.  
Pelfrey characterizes the importance of prevention to the Cycle of Preparedness in the 
following manner: “The Cycle of Preparedness places greater weight on Prevention…It 
does not carry with it the assumption that there must be an incident as an initiator of 
the Cycle. Indeed, an organization or jurisdiction 
must simultaneously prepare for prevention 
activities, response capacity, and recovery 
capabilities.”8 The Prevention Cube is a "thinking 
tool", a heuristic device, useful in analyzing the way 
prevention principles inform risk management and 
enable preemption of terrorist threats. It draws 
from the Cycle of Preparedness framework, yet 
focuses specifically on prevention, representing the 
prevention process as a set of steps (front side – 
Figure 1) that involve preparedness professionals 
working together and sharing information to 
recognize threats posed to communities.  
Individuals plotting terrorist attacks make 
strategic choices to develop specific capabilities 
based on what they see as vulnerable targets. A 
targeted community can also make choices that 
lessen its vulnerabilities (top side – Figure 1) and 
identify the weakness of potential attackers’  
capabilities. The Prevention Cube exemplifies how  
key variables of the prevention process relate. Although it implies steps of prevention 
occur in a sequence, that sequence (front side – Figure 1) doesn’t have an exact start or 
finish, nor do collaboration, information sharing, or threat recognition activities happen 
in any particular order. The purpose of the prevention process is to manage the risks 
posed by existing threats and vulnerabilities, and make decisions about how and when 
to intervene against threats (right side – Figure 1) to protect against them, deter them, 
or preempt them (top side – Figure 1). Authorities can intervene against threats when 
the risk posed is in: 
1. Primary Mode: An intervention to reduce risk when specific threats are 
unknown but a threat capability, or vulnerability, is recognized. 
2. Secondary Mode: An intervention to reduce risk after a specific threat is 
recognized but no immediate threat exists. 
3. Tertiary Mode: An intervention to reduce, or preempt, a threat that 
poses a clear-and-present danger.9 
 
The following analysis explores several successful and preempted (unsuccessful) 
terrorist plots in the United Kingdom. We explore the way the Agencies collaborated 
and shared information to identify threats posed by al Qaeda. Specifically, the analysis 
herein uses the Prevention Cube as an interpretive resource to analyze recent patterns of 
terrorism prevention in the United Kingdom. The discussion examines the patterns of 
collaboration, information sharing, threat recognition, risk management, and decisions 
Figure 1 – Prevention Cube 
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by the Agencies to intervene against a range of terrorist plots. Each section of the 
analysis focuses on one of the five steps in the Prevention Cube framework relative to 
specific activities taken by the Agencies to manage the risks posed by al Qaeda to the 
United Kingdom. 
As explained below, the prevention process is not simply a set of linear steps – 
especially the process of collaborating and sharing information to recognize threats. 
Prevention often involves cycling through opportunities to recognize threat, gauge risks, 
and make decisions about intervening. The cycling can occur multiple times and 
improves in effectiveness when those attempting to prevent terrorist attacks view 
terrorist organizations, particularly al Qaeda, as networks capable of operating without 
an explicit command and control hierarchy.10  
MI5, in particular, missed key opportunities to develop information about the 7 July 
and 21 July terrorist plots in large part because its risk management strategy failed to 
use a network conception of terrorist cells and connections between cells. Rather, the 
available open source information indicates MI5 selected avenues of investigation based 
largely on a hierarchical model of an investigative target’s relationship to foreign al 
Qaeda operatives or associates. While recognizing the network of relationships 
underlying a terrorist organization is certainly easier after the fact, failing to use a 
network conception of terrorist organization against al Qaeda in the prevention process 
makes successful preemption less likely.11 
THE CONTEXT 
The Agencies are facing an ongoing threat by Islamic extremists as evidenced in the 
frequency of attacks and ongoing plots in the United Kingdom. The Agencies preempted 
several attack plots over the past few years. Several attacks occurred as well, though only 
one actually resulted in a successful execution with lethal consequences. The following 
analysis examines the patterns of activity common to both types of attack plot. 
Preempted Attacks 
Details about the fertilizer bomb investigation from 2004, Operation Crevice, became 
available once the trial started in 2006 and after the verdicts in 2007. Operation Crevice 
is the name given to an investigation into a 2004 plot to build a car bomb using 
ammonium nitrate fertilizer. At the time, it was the most complex counterterrorism 
operation ever undertaken in the UK. In the spring of 2007, five men received life 
sentences for their roles in the plot.12 
The liquid bomb plot that targeted commercial airlines in 2006 is still under pretrial 
restriction but salient facts regarding the way authorities disrupted the plot are available 
as we note below.  
Successfully Executed Attacks 
By “successfully executed” we mean the attack plot was carried out. Even though the 
bombs did not explode in two of these three attacks, the plot itself went undiscovered 
and the attackers were able to execute their operation.  
On July 7, 2005 around, 0850, three explosions rocked the London Underground 
System (hereafter the Tube) and one additional explosion ripped through a London bus 
in Tavistock Place. The explosions resulted from suicide bomb attacks by Mohammed 
Siddeque Khan, Hasib Hussein, Shazad Tanweer, and Jermaine Lindsay. The first three 
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were British nationals of Pakistani descent, born and raised in the United Kingdom. 
Lindsay was a British national of West Indian Origin and a Muslim convert. All of the 
bombers on 7 July died in the attack, so investigators developed very little information 
on the plot from them directly. Khan and Tanweer recorded suicide videos while visiting 
Pakistan and that fact made al Qaeda involvement evident, as al Qaeda released the 
videos to the public.13 
On 21 July 2005, between 1235 and 1305, three additional bomb attempts occurred in 
the Tube. Six individuals were charged. In July 2007, a jury convicted Yassin Omar, 
Ramzi Mohammed, Hussain Osman, and Muktar Said Ibrahim, the leader of the plot. 
The same jury failed to reach a verdict on two others, Manfo Kwaku Asiedu and Adel 
Yahya. Police developed information regarding the 21 July plot from the defendants as 
well as other sources. The essential facts relating to the plot became public as the trial 
proceeded. We discuss them below. 
On 29 June 2007, Kafeel Ahmed, Dr Bilal Abdullah, Dr. Mohammed Asha, and Dr 
Sabeel Ahmed attempted to detonate a car bomb outside a nightclub in London and, 
after failing to detonate the car bombs, mounted a suicide bomb attack on the Glasgow 
airport on 30 June. The bomb in the attack on the Glasgow airport also failed to 
detonate, with Ahmed incurring burns on 90 percent of his body and dying in early 
August. Bilal Adbullah, Mohammed Asha, and Sabeel Ahmed are awaiting trial. 
Australian authorities arrested a fourth man, Dr Mohammed Haneef, at the request of 
the UK. Haneef gave his cell phone’s sim card to Kafeel Ahmed for use on a mobile 
phone used in the attack. The Australian authorities subsequently freed Haneef who 
returned to his home in India.  
The government released two official reports following investigations into the lethal 
attacks on 7 July. One report came from the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) 
of Parliament14 and the other in a response of the government to the ISC report.15 Both 
pointed to several shortcomings in efforts by MI5, the Security Service or domestic spy 
service in the United Kingdom, as well as the other security agencies, to prevent the 
attacks.  
The reports relied heavily on witnesses, written assessments, and intelligence reports 
by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) as well as the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre 
(JTAC). Yet information developed from the recently concluded trial of the 21 July 
attackers, as well as developments in the terrorist threat evidenced by the June 2007 
attack attempts in London and Glasgow, add fundamentally to our understanding of 
MI5’s failure to recognize the attackers of 7 July and 21 July as operational threats, 
thereby missing chances to preempt the attacks. 
PREVENTION IN PRACTICE 
Collaboration 
The Prevention Cube treats collaboration as the basic building block of prevention. 
Though MI5 is most effective when it collaborates with the Special Branch police, the 
history of collaboration between the two agencies is a challenged one. As Peter Chalk 
and William Rosenau note, “areas of friction have arisen between the Security Service 
and local Special Branch police, particularly in instances in which MI5 case officers have 
moved to centrally sanitize intelligence gathered from covert human sources employed 
in joint-owned operations.”16 
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Prior to the 7 July and 21 July attacks, MI5 recognized the existence of “home-grown” 
terrorists but gave little credibility to arguments that any operations threatened the UK. 
The focus prior to 7 July was on plots where key al Qaeda operatives were involved, 
largely originating from outside the United Kingdom. The 7 July and 21 July bombings 
refocused attention on the terrorist threat to the UK in several distinct ways. In their 
examination of the 7 July bombings, British authorities determined a need for more 
collaboration between MI5 and the Special Branches to help prevent future attacks by 
home-grown terrorists: 
More needs to be done to improve the way that the Security Service and Special 
Branches come together in a combined and coherent way to tackle the “home-
grown” threat. We welcome steps that are now being taken to achieve this 
although, given that the ‘home-grown’ threat had clearly already been recognized, 
we are concerned that more was not done sooner.17 
The overall shortcomings in effective collaboration before 7 July reached across the 
security and intelligence services, including the Security Service (MI5), the Secret 
Intelligence Service (SIS) or MI6, and the Government Communications Headquarters 
(GCHQ). In particular, prior to 2005, the SIS provided insufficient intelligence coverage 
on countries like Pakistan where al Qaeda still maintains training camps. At the same 
time, the focus of MI5 investigations was largely on plots involving direct connections to 
al Qaeda operatives in Pakistan.  
All the terrorist attacks, except the most recent one, and the two disrupted plots, 
involved al Qaeda affiliates in Pakistan supplying key training and planning resources to 
those involved in the plots. Manfo Kwaku Asiedu, charged in the 21 July plot testified 
that Ibrahim, the leader of the 21 July attack, and Khan, the leader of the 7 July attack, 
were in Pakistan at the same time and planned the attacks there.18 In addition, 
Mohammed Junaid Babar, who was arrested in New York for planning attacks on 
financial institutions on the U.S. east coast, testified as part of a plea bargain that Khan 
traveled to the Pakistan border near Afghanistan in 2003 for terrorism training.19 
The relationship between the U.K. and Pakistan is a complex one with a rich history. 
More than 400,000 people travel between the two countries each year. The Agencies do 
not know how many of those people continue their journey to Afghanistan or the tribal 
areas of Pakistan. Estimates are that as many as 4,000 Islamic extremists have attended 
camps in Afghanistan and returned.20 However, the pattern of attacks and disrupted 
plots indicates an overall coordination between Islamic extremists, al Qaeda or its 
affiliates, in Pakistan, and the home-grown terrorists of the UK. The pattern indicates 
an ongoing ability of al Qaeda to act as a network providing training and planning 
resources as well as an ideological source of motivation, without the exposure of a 
command and control hierarchy.21  
It is now clear MI5 knew about Khan well prior to 7 July, but failed to make key 
connections related to his activities. In early 2004, detainees from outside the UK 
referred to a man during questioning, known only through pseudonyms, who they 
claimed had traveled to Pakistan in 2003 seeking a meeting with al Qaeda leaders. MI5 
tried to establish the man’s identity but failed. As it turned out, Khan was the man. One 
of the detainees after 7 July identified a photograph taken of Khan at one of the 
meetings in 2004. Khan in fact did travel to Pakistan in 2003 and spent time there again 
with Tanweer from November 2004 to February 2005. Apparently, authorities did not 
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show the photograph to the detainee until after the 7 July attacks. The detainee then 
identified the person in the photograph as Khan. 
In other words, MI5 did not pursue specific opportunities to develop intelligence 
about Khan and Tanweer. In instances where it did develop intelligence on Khan from 
other ongoing investigations, MI5 did not pursue those opportunities. For example, MI5 
considered Khan and Tanweer peripheral to the Operation Crevice investigation. The 
judgment was accurate in quantitative terms, but telling and consequential in analytic 
terms.  
INFORMATION SHARING: THE UNKNOWN AS AN INFORMATION 
SOURCE 
Operation Crevice resulted from information provided by an employee at a rental-
storage business where the terrorist cell was storing the fertilizer for a bomb. He became 
suspicious and contacted the authorities. Similarly, following the 7 July and 21 July 
attacks, MI5 received a tip from a member of the Muslim community regarding an 
acquaintance thought to be involved in terrorist-related activity. MI5 started 
investigating the individual and, over time, the liquid bomb plot was uncovered. In fact, 
the investigators substituted a different chemical for the fertilizer during Operation 
Crevice, without the plotters’ discovering the switch. Applying the Prevention Cube (top 
side – Figure 1) suggests that this countermeasure was essentially a step to Protect 
against the threat capability posed by the plot even if the plotters executed the plan. 
Essentially, such a protective measure permitted MI5 to extend its investigation of a 
recognized Secondary Mode risk (right side – Figure 1) rather than intervene sooner 
to Preempt the threat posing the risk. Consider the following summary of Operation 
Crevice in the context of the Prevention Cube: 
In many ways both the primary and secondary modes are focused on making 
good use of time available to prevent and mitigate, rather than just respond to 
risk.…After initial surveillance it was decided the plotters were still in the process 
of gathering bomb elements. The risk was still in secondary mode. As a result, 
surveillance continued in order to identify all the plotters, their sources of 
support, and other operational details. The arrest was timed to ensure the risk 
did not enter the tertiary mode, but it was delayed to maximize the options 
available in the secondary mode.22 
The UK authorities also preempted the liquid bomb plot in August 2006 after months of 
intensive surveillance involving British, American, and Pakistani intelligence agencies. 
In other words, in the two most noted British successes in disrupting terrorist attacks, 
the prevention of the plots began with human intelligence from the public. Authorities 
knew the source of the information that initiated or bolstered the investigation. 
One of the major lessons learned from 7 July and 21 July is that opportunities to 
investigate the unknowns relating to a case require proactive intelligence practices. 
What is not known must be explored in order to make informed decisions about what 
needs to be learned. As the ISC report noted:*  
…the main lesson learned from the July attacks was the need to get into “the 
unknowns” – to find ways of broadening coverage to pick up currently unknown 
terrorist activity or plots. We were told that Security Service and police efforts 
prior to July were focused on following up known intelligence leads in the UK, 
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arising either out of other terrorist investigations, from GCHQ or the SIS, or from 
foreign intelligence reporting. Resources were fully consumed with the pursuit of 
existing leads and there was little capacity to look beyond to see where other 
threats might be developing. Steps are now being taken to develop a more 
proactive approach to identifying threats in the UK, first through *** and second 
through closer working with the police at the local level.23 
* The asterisks represent redaction 
The 7 July and 21 July attacks heightened recognition that much remains unknown 
about the ideologically motivated Islamist activity at the local level in the UK, and its 
relationship to al Qaeda affiliates in Pakistan. The focus since the attacks is on building 
a “rich picture” of local extremists using the police, MI5, and the police Special Branches 
working closely together. The Special Branches are a part of the police forces but also 
recruit and run agents for MI5. As noted previously, the relationship between the two 
has been difficult historically.  
The local constabulary funds the Special Branches and, in the past, that caused 
significant differences in their effectiveness from locale to locale. Since 7 July, an 
emphasis on national standards for the Special Branches is evident. The ISC report 
concludes: 
Special branches continue to vary in size and competence…. There is, moreover, 
no specific requirement for their Special Branches to meet a certain standard in 
the counter-terrorism work they do conduct in support of the Security Service…. 
The value of closer joint working between the Security Service and the police on a 
more local level is one of the key lessons to arise from the July attacks…. Where 
there may in the past have been a reluctance to give bad news and upset good 
relations, there appears, rightly, to be more determination post-July for problems 
or areas of weakness to be identified and resolved.24 
The Terrorism Act of 2006 made it a criminal offense to directly or indirectly encourage 
the commission, preparation, or instigation of acts of terrorism or to disseminate 
terrorist publications, including statements or publications glorifying terrorism. The Act 
also broadened the legal basis for proscribing organizations that promote or encourage 
terrorism. Therefore, the local police and the Special Branches, as well as MI5, now 
possess extensive legal authority to gather intelligence from extremist groups and 
intervene using a variety of state powers, including extending the period of pre-charge 
detention from fourteen to twenty-eight days.25 Whether these new powers will make a 
difference in MI5’s decisions about investigating individuals who are peripheral to an 
ongoing investigation into high priority targets is an important question. 
Indeed, the 2007 bomb attacks in London on 29 June and Glasgow on 30 June point 
to continuing problems regarding MI5’s ability to recognize information with significant 
intelligence value. Bilal Abdulla and Mohammed Asha, who lived almost 300 miles 
apart, kept in regular contact, with their discussions intercepted by GCHQ and drawing 
the attention of MI5. However, the intelligence point of view on missed opportunities to 
learn about unknowns turns the criticism of failed assessment on its head. An 
intelligence source was quoted saying,  
The fact that these two had already been flagged up, albeit in a very minor 
capacity, is a great relief because it shows that we are doing our job. The 
nightmare scenario is a case when we get hold of someone or learn about 
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someone who has never before crossed our path. Then you have to start from 
scratch.26 
The point echoes the position taken by MI5 about its failure to give Khan and Tanweer 
higher priority as investigation targets before 7 July.  
MI5 noted that the links between Khan and Tanweer and the fertilizer bomb plotters 
represented less than 0.1 percent of all the links on record for Operation Crevice. 
Nevertheless, the ISC report’s point about exploring the unknowns in an investigation 
implies that the total quantity of links is not sufficient for determining whether an 
opportunity to investigate a peripheral target is reasonable. The context of the links 
means a lot as well. MI5 surveillance also linked Khan and Tanweer to the leader of the 
fertilizer bomb plot, Omar Khyam. That fact meant as much to Khan and Tanweer’s 
intelligence value as how many links existed between them and the fertilizer bomb 
plotters as a group. After all, Khyam was the known leader of the fertilizer bomb plot.  
A brief discussion of two key concepts from social network analysis (SNA) will clarify 
the point regarding the investigation of unknowns and the risk management strategy 
used by the Agencies. In its most basic form, social network analysis distinguishes 
between two types of centrality measures that appear relevant to the point, specifically 
degree centrality and betweenness centrality.27  
Degree Centrality 
Degree centrality is broken down in SNA according to in-degree centrality and out-
degree centrality. The former refers to the number of incoming links an individual has 
in a given relationship. The latter refers to the number of outgoing links an individual 
has in a given relationship. A social network with high degrees of both is a highly 
cohesive network for all members, resembling what John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt 
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Differences between in-degree and out-degree centrality occur in networks where some 
members are more connected to the network than others. Some members exert more 
influence on the network by having high out-degree centrality (e.g. Khan and Tanweer 
in Figure 3), whereas the network influences others who have high in-degree centrality 
(e.g. Lindsay and Hussein in Figure 3).29 
Betweenness Centrality 
MI5’s point that it decided not to continue surveillance of Khan and Tanweer because 
the quantity of Khan and Tanweer’s links to the fertilizer bomb plotters targeted in 
Operation Crevice were less than 0.1 percent of the total links fails to take into account 
the betweenness centrality of Khyam. Betweenness centrality refers to relationships 
where one individual provides the most direct connection between two or more groups. 
These individuals bridge networks, or subnetworks.30 In the case of Khan and Tanweer, 
Khyam was likely serving a liaison role rather than a broker role (Figure 3), meaning his 
betweenness was not likely critical to their plot but was indicative of Khan and 
Tanweer’s intelligence value. MI5 recognized the first point but apparently missed the 






Links existed between Khan and Tanweer to other members of the fertilizer bomb plot 
since MI5 observed them driving with the group. However, the open source intelligence 
indicates their connections with Khyam were denser, more frequent. Given Khyam’s 
leadership in the fertilizer bomb plot, of which authorities were aware, the repeated 
links MI5 observed between Khan and Tanweer to Khyam were significant when 
compared to their links to other members of the plot. 
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THREAT RECOGNITION 
Failing to recognize the threat that British nationals were capable of and likely to engage 
in suicide bombing was one of the major shortcomings of British authorities, specifically 
MI5, before 7 July 2005. This was despite the fact that Richard Reid, who tried to 
detonate a shoe bomb on an American Airlines flight to the United States, was a British 
citizen. The ISC report also states that Omar Sharif and Asif Hanif, two young British 
Muslims, tried to execute a suicide bomb attack against a bar in Tel Aviv in 2003. (The 
BBC corrected the point, noting that one of the bombers set off the device killing three 
people, while the other detonated later to avoid capture.)  
The Agencies did not adequately appreciate the threat posed by home-grown 
terrorists: 
We remain concerned that across the whole of the counter-terrorism community 
the development of the home-grown threat and the radicalisation of British 
citizens were not fully understood or applied to strategic thinking.31 
The Prevention Cube is helpful in sorting out the issues involved and providing a 
coherent interpretation of the developments. The threat from British nationals, willing 
to plan and execute suicide bomb attacks against iconic targets like the Tube, was in fact 
a recognized Primary Mode risk by the security agencies before 7 July.  
In other words, the Agencies recognized the Tube as a likely target for terrorists given 
the frequency of al Qaeda inspired terrorist attacks on mass transit, and the Madrid 
bombings of 2004. Yet, the protective measures taken mostly aimed to deter terrorists 
from attacking who were not engaging in suicide bombing. The video surveillance 
system in the Tube is one of the most extensive in the world. It was highly effective in 
permitting the authorities to determine who the suicide bombers were after the fact, but 
ineffective in deterring them from the attack.  
To some extent, one could reasonably surmise that the strategy and tactics of the 
PIRA, with its focus on volunteer safety, still dominated the counterterrorism thinking 
of the Agencies on deterrence before 7 July.  
The Agencies had intelligence from their own investigations and third parties that 
pointed in at least seven ways to the 7 July leader, Khan, as a higher priority figure than 
thought at the time. 
1. In his book, The One Percent Doctrine, Ron Suskind contends that Khan was 
planning to visit the United States in February 2003.32 Khan had done so 
three times since 2001. The CIA contacted the FBI to ask for a coordinated 
effort to track Khan’s movements and contacts. An NSA surveillance program 
recorded Khan’s communication with other Islamic extremists in the United 
States, with clear indications of an interest in mounting attacks in the U.S. 
Yet, according to Ron Suskind, the FBI and the CIA were unable to work out 
their differences over which agency would accept responsibility for Khan’s 
activities if he initiated an attack while in the country. In other words, neither 
agency wanted the responsibility of managing a Secondary Mode risk. As a 
result, the FBI placed Khan on a “no-fly” list the night before he was supposed 
to catch a flight to the United States. U.S. authorities reportedly told British 
officials of Khan’s plans and the decision to place him on a “no-fly” list and 
forwarded a detailed file.33  
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2. Khan and Tanweer met with the leader of the fertilizer bomb plot, Omar 
Khyam, at least five times in the weeks of the final planning stages of the plot. 
Khan and Tanweer were among a group of men meeting, where others at the 
meeting were under MI5 surveillance in 2004. MI5 considered Khayam a high 
level, or “essential,” target. “Essential” targets are highest priority with the 
most immediate claim on resources, with “desirable” targets second, and 
“other” last. The distinctions depend on the degree of affiliation to al Qaeda 
that the target is suspected of possessing. The meetings in 2004 were 
associated with the ongoing investigation in Operation Crevice.  
3. Khan and Tanweer were among fifty-five individuals considered worthy of 
follow up after the charges were filed against the fertilizer bomb plotters. 
Fifteen were considered essential to follow up, and forty were considered 
desirable. Khan and Tanweer were in the latter group. 
4. MI5 had also bugged a conversation between Khan and Omar Khyam, leader 
of the "fertilizer bomb" terrorists arrested as part of Operation Crevice. Court 
transcripts showed the two were discussing going to Pakistan to train as well 
as how to commit financial fraud to support their activities.34 
5. Khan and Tanweer were followed while driving with the fertilizer bomb 
plotters and took anti-surveillance precautions. The Agencies followed the car 
that Khan ultimately drove to his home. 
6. In March 2004, the authorities checked the ownership of the vehicle Khan 
drove and found it was registered to his wife. Two months later, another 
ownership check showed it registered to Khan under a different address. 
7. Clear evidence from surveillance tapes showed Khan was planning on 
acquiring terrorism training overseas and discussing specific attack plans. 
The ISC report indicates that, at the time, MI5’s assessment suggested Khan and 
Tanweer’s focus was training and insurgency operations in Pakistan, and schemes to 
defraud financial institutions. However, we now know that MI5 did not give the ISC a 
full accounting of how much it knew about Khan in particular.  
More recently, Shadow Home Secretary David Davis questioned the Home Secretary, 
John Reid about MI5’s failure to disclose all the relevant information. 
It seems that MI5 taped Mohammad Sidique Khan talking about his wish to fight 
in the jihad and saying his goodbyes to his family -- a clear indication that he was 
intending a suicide mission....[H]e was known to have attended late-stage 
discussions on planning another major terror attack. Again, I ask the Home 
Secretary whether that is true.35 
Mr. Reid indicated the question was relevant but declined to answer it. We now know 
Khan was a threat posing a Secondary Mode risk that developed over a period from 
2003 while he organized the other three members for the 7 July attacks. Additionally, 
the ISC reports that the intelligence services now believe Khan met with al Qaeda during 
his visit to Pakistan and Afghanistan in 2003. A Secondary Mode risk occurs when 
there are early signals of a specific threat emerging. As noted above, there were at least 
seven points of intelligence indicating that Khan posed a terrorist threat.  
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MI5 made a similar series of omissions and judgments about the leader of the 
unsuccessful 21 July bomb attacks, Muktar Said Ibrahim.  
1. Ibrahim was photographed in May 2004 at a jihadi training camp in the 
north-west of England. As the Times noted, Ibrahim aroused suspicion from 
his association with Rauf Mohammed who actively supported the insurgency 
in Iraq. Mohammed drove Ibrahim and two traveling companions to the 
airport in December 2004 as they flew to Pakistan for terrorist training.36  
2. The association with Mohammed resulted in Ibrahim and his traveling 
companions being questioned at the airport by Special Branch police.  
3. Ibrahim was arrested at an extremist bookstall in London for scuffling with a 
policeman over extremist literature Ibrahim was distributing, and an 
outstanding warrant for his arrest was issued for failing to show in court on a 
public order offense.  
4. Ibrahim was given a British passport and allowed to leave the country despite 
a prior criminal record and an outstanding warrant. Officers found a large 
amount of cash, mountain gear, and a first-aid manual with marked passages 
on treating gunshot wounds. Ibrahim was permitted to leave after explaining 
he was going to Pakistan to attend a wedding.  
5. MI5 received an alert upon Ibrahim’s return to the UK in early 2005. It 
considered him a low-key target and missed the fact that he was recruiting a 
cell of suicide bombers.  
On July 21, 2005, Ibrahim attempted to blow up the No. 26 bus. His accomplices, Yassin 
Omar, Hussein Osman, and Ramzi Mohammed also failed in their bomb attempts. 
Luckily, none of the devices exploded. 
A Tertiary Mode risk poses imminent harm from a recognized, specific threat. 
MI5 now believes Khan and Tanweer underwent operational training while in Pakistan. 
Moreover, leading up to the attack, during the tertiary risk period, Khan was in contact 
on over 200 calls from his phone to various phone booths and mobile phones in 
Pakistan. Interestingly, the ISC report did not criticize the Government 
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) for failing to consider the pattern of contacts 
significant. Although the ISC report did not spell out exactly how the security service 
plans to go about it, the future focus is on an increasingly proactive strategy using a 
network analysis approach.* 
Security Service and police efforts prior to July were focused on following up 
known intelligence leads in the UK, arising either out of other terrorist 
investigations, from GCHQ or the SIS, or from foreign intelligence reporting. 
Resources were fully consumed with the pursuit of existing leads and there was 
little capacity to look beyond to see where other threats might be developing. 
Steps are now being taken to develop a more proactive approach to identifying 
threats in the UK, first through *** and second through closer working with the 
police at the local level. The potential value of *** and *** as a means for 
identifying new threats has been highlighted to the Committee. The fact that the 7 
July group was in contact with others under Security Service investigation has 
emphasised the potential for new threats to be identified through the 
examination of information and contact networks relating to existing targets. 
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Greater capacity to *** to generate new leads is being developed within the 
Security Service.37 
* The asterisks represent redaction 
As part of the overall proactive strategy, a discussion of whether to change the law and 
allow authorities to use intercepted communication as evidence is underway. Drawing 
from the U.S. experience, the director of public prosecutions contends that using 
intercepts as evidence will increase terrorism prosecutions and drive up the percent of 
guilty pleas, making control orders less necessary.38 The Prevention of Terrorism Act of 
2005 authorized the secretary of state, under judicial oversight, to issue a control order 
to place one or more obligations on individuals to prevent, restrict, or disrupt their 
involvement in terrorism-related activity. The obligations can include curfews, 
restrictions on use of communications equipment, restrictions on personal associations 
with others, and travel restrictions.39  
Some observers, citing patterns of prosecution in the United States, contend that 
allowing intercepts as evidence will decrease the need to use control orders by 
increasing guilty pleas, thereby allowing more prosecutions. 40 The Baroness Scotland of 
Asthal, Patricia Janet Scotland, a barrister and attorney general for England and Wales, 
a ministerial position in the British Government, disagrees with the contention that 
using intercepts as evidence will increase prosecutions. On the contrary, Baroness 
Scotland contends that,  
It is sometimes argued that if only we could produce intercept evidence against 
terrorists we would be able to lock more of them up and avoid measures such as 
control orders. That is simply untrue. The last review concluded that there would 
be, I emphasize, very limited utility against terrorists.41 
It is unclear how the policy issue of using intercepts as evidence will develop. Allowing 
intercepts to qualify as evidence raises a range of issues that come from long-standing 
traditions involving the relationship of MI5 to the Special Branches and the local 
constabulary. Allowing intercepted communication to count as evidence at trial might 
well result in the UK preempting threats earlier in their development, effectively 
reducing the Agencies’ timeframe for managing Secondary Mode risks.  
RISK MANAGEMENT 
One of the inherent challenges of prevention is the impossibility of preventing all 
adverse events. Judgments made at specific points in time influence what threats 
authorities recognize, and the conceptual framework in which they assess risk. The most 
important thing is to base those judgments on good information and a full recognition of 
the threats, known and, to the extent possible, unknown. Allowing previous 
assessments of a target’s priority to determine how new opportunities, i.e. linkages, to 
investigate the target are managed tends to preclude, or at least minimize, a concern 
with the unknown. The 7 July attackers benefited from that overall counterterrorism 
strategy, as did those involved in the 21 July attack.   
In addition to MI5 hierarchically organizing investigative targets according to 
whether they are “essential,” “desirable,” or “other,” the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre 
(JTAC) also introduced an analogous three-tier, hierarchical model in early 2005 
regarding the degrees of connection between targets and al Qaeda leadership:  
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Tier 1 described individuals or networks thought to have direct links to al Qaeda.  
Tier 2 described individuals or networks loosely affiliated with al Qaeda.  
Tier 3 described individuals or networks inspired by al Qaeda ideology.  
In May 2005, JTAC considered the majority of its focus on individuals and groups from 
Tiers 2 and 3 only loosely affiliated to al Qaeda or entirely separate (albeit with shared 
ideological beliefs). JTAC considered the group responsible for the Madrid bombings in 
2004 a Tier 3 group. 
The Agencies used tiered designations to prioritize resource expenditure, but none of 
these hierarchies took into account the relevance of unknown factors. If investigators 
had kept in mind a network conception of al Qaeda organization, rather than directing 
activities through hierarchical assessments driven by what was “known,” different 
decisions might have led them to discover what Khan and Tanweer were up to. The ISC 
report reaches the same conclusion in a more indirect way: 
The chances of identifying attack planning and of preventing the 7 July attacks 
might have been greater had different investigative decisions been taken in 
2003–2005. Nonetheless, we conclude that, in light of the other priority 
investigations being conducted and the limitations on Security Service resources, 
the decisions not to give greater investigative priority to these two individuals 
were understandable.42 
In other words, the ISC and government reports agree that scarcity of resources, rather 
than mistaken decisions about risk, was the main reason MI5 did not investigate the two 
men, though it indicates that the investigative decisions made during the crucial time 
period between 2003 and 2005 could have affected the outcome.  
MI5 allocated resources to investigate Khan and Tanweer late in 2004, probably 
because they were among the fifty-five individuals deemed to merit follow up after 
Operation Crevice. However, MI5 soon diverted the funding to investigations considered 
higher priority. Yet, a number of experts question whether the ISC report’s focus on 
resources was adequate to develop an understanding of how MI5 decision making went 
wrong.  
A number of experts are increasingly frustrated by the concentration on the 
numbers game in the aftermath of the attacks. “To say that the intelligence 
services are exonerated and were hampered by lack of resources really says 
nothing of substance,” said Mike Smith, an intelligence expert at King's College, 
London. “One can have vast resources and still make mistakes, miss out what is 
going on and fail to connect the dots - think of the failure of the vast intelligence 
resources in the US to anticipate the 9/11 attacks.” The assessment of Anthony 
Glees, a renowned intelligence-watcher from Brunel University, is even more 
emphatic. He told Scotland on Sunday: "MI5 seems to have wanted it both ways: 
first of all punters like myself learned from our sources that the problem had 
been one of 'resources'. But just a few days ago, I was told that resources were 
not the problem - the problem had been one of failed assessment. If it had been 
'resources' it would have prompted the next question: 'Did you ask Gordon 
Brown for more cash?' But I am told they did not ask for more cash in 2005 
because they were more or less satisfied with what they had.”43 
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Regardless of MI5’s view of its need for resources in 2005, the service has since 
increased its overall staff significantly. Yet MI5’s methods for establishing who is a high 
priority target, and who isn’t, were only indirectly assessed by the ISC report.  
Nevertheless, the decision not to give Khan and Tanweer greater priority at the time 
points to a failure on the part of investigators’ assessment of their importance. The 
investigations failed to recognize that individuals connected on multiple occasions with 
other, higher priority, individuals under active surveillance present opportunities to 
learn about unknown threats, i.e. nodes in a network, that increase the lower priority 
target’s intelligence value.  
It is reasonable to assume that the Agencies’ experience with PIRA informed efforts 
against al Qaeda since, even after PIRA restructured itself from a hierarchical, military 
style organization to a group of loosely-coupled cells in the 1980s, high profile attacks 
on UK government officials that required special teams were still typically controlled 
directly by the GHC [General Headquarters].44 Similarly, al Qaeda operational leaders 
based in Afghanistan largely directed the attacks on 9/11.45 The 7 July attack 
demonstrated that the kind of direct coordination informing the counterterrorism 
strategy of the Agencies was insufficient to detect the emerging threat from home-grown 
terrorist attacks by Islamic extremists.  
It appears that authorities now recognize the importance of thinking in network 
analysis terms as well as hierarchical priority structures when considering the relative 
importance of targets in a terrorism investigation. MI5 still contends it cannot follow up 
100 percent of the individuals it comes across that are peripheral to an investigation, but 
security sources are quoted saying that figures peripheral to investigations are 
constantly reassessed currently.46 As we noted above, individuals considered peripheral, 
yet connected with leaders of other ongoing plots, offer increased intelligence value 
since those leaders’ betweenness status can indicate a broker or liaison role. 
INTERVENTION 
MI5 did not develop intelligence to allow it to make a decision to intervene against the 
attackers of 7 July or 21 July. The risk-management strategy largely precluded 
development of intervention opportunities. The ISC and government reports contend 
that, if more resources had been in place, authorities might have had more information 
to share, leading to better threat recognition, and a risk-management decision that was 
more in line with the actual threat. The result might have been an opportunity to 
intervene. 
The story of what was known about the 7 July group prior to July indicates 
that if more resources had been in place sooner the chances of preventing 
the July attacks could have increased. Greater coverage in Pakistan, or 
more resources generally in the UK, might have alerted the Agencies to the 
intentions of the 7 July group.47 
Our analysis indicates that the experience of dealing with PIRA conditioned the risk 
management strategy the Agencies used to investigate threats posed by al Qaeda. In the 
case of PIRA, a hierarchical command structure remained in control for strategic attacks 
on members of the UK government, even after PIRA restructured itself into operational 
cells. Al Qaeda operations in the UK appear to follow a different pattern. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
This article used the Prevention Cube to identify patterns of terrorism prevention in the 
United Kingdom since 2004. It discussed successful attack plots and preempted attack 
plots using the key concepts of the Prevention Cube to think through the assumptions 
made by the Agencies in the UK regarding the risks posed by the terrorist threat of al 
Qaeda. 
The discussion suggested that the experience with PIRA conditioned the Agencies in 
the UK to think hierarchically about risks posed by terrorist threats. A different risk 
management strategy informed by social network analysis could have affected the 
assessments made in Operation Crevice regarding which individuals to pursue on the 
periphery of those investigations. Khan and Tanweer, though peripheral to the fertilizer 
bomb plot, were key leaders in the 7 July terrorist attack.  
As a heuristic device, the Prevention Cube does not predict the conditions under 
which collaboration, information sharing, or threat recognition explain the success of a 
particular risk management strategy or intervention decision. Rather, the Prevention 
Cube provides an exemplar for guiding risk management. It informs an adaptive 
strategy for efforts to collaborate, share information, and recognize threats in each 
decision to intervene to protect, deter, or preempt risks posed.  
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